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 ________ 
 
On Appeal from the United States District Court 
for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania 
(D.C. No. 2-09-cr-00419-001) 
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SLOVITER, Circuit Judge. 
 Anthony Clay appeals the District Court‟s imposition of a 240-month sentence of 
imprisonment, followed by five years of supervised release.  For the reasons below, we 
will affirm.
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I. 
 In 2008, Clay was arrested and found in possession of 2.783 grams of cocaine 
base, a handgun, and $305 in cash.  He was charged with possessing cocaine base with 
intent to distribute in violation of 21 U.S.C. § 841(a)(1), (b)(1)(C); possessing a firearm 
in furtherance of a drug trafficking offense, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 924(c)(1); and 
possessing a firearm after having previously been convicted of a felony, in violation of 18 
U.S.C. § 922(g)(1).  Clay was convicted after a trial.  At sentencing, Clay did not dispute 
that the career offender guideline applied to him, but argued that the range the guideline 
produced – 360 months to life – was too high.  The District Court departed downward 
and sentenced Clay to 240 months imprisonment, followed by six years of supervised 
release.  The Court stressed the seriousness of the offense and deterrence as reasons for 
the sentence.  Clay appealed his sentence.   
 This court vacated and remanded for resentencing, citing two errors:  The District 
Court may have mistakenly believed that the mandatory minimum term of supervised 
release on Count One was six years, when it was three years; and the sentence imposed 
on Count Three exceeded the statutory maximum.  See United States v. Clay, 449 F. 
                                              
1
  The District Court had jurisdiction pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 3231 and we have 
jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1291 and 18 U.S.C. § 3742(a). 
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App‟x 227, 230-31 (3d Cir. 2011).  On remand, Clay documented that during the 
pendency of his appeal, he had been diagnosed with a psychotic disorder.  He had not 
previously been diagnosed with a mental illness.  Clay argued for a lower sentence in 
both his sentencing memorandum and at the sentencing hearing.  He stated that the 
recently diagnosed illness required the Court to reconsider its previous sentence pursuant 
to the 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a) considerations of deterrence, just punishment, and 
rehabilitation.  The District Court imposed a sentence of 240 months, followed by five 
years of supervised release.  Clay timely appealed.   
II. 
Clay asserts that the District Court erred by failing to meaningfully consider his 
mental illness in determining his sentence.  The Government contends that our previous 
remand limited the District Court to addressing the two identified errors, and the Court 
could not consider Clay‟s mental illness.  The Government further argues that even if the 
District Court could consider Clay‟s mental illness, we should review for plain error 
because Clay did not object to the sufficiency of the District Court‟s consideration of his 
mental health diagnosis.  Clay states that he preserved the issue by alerting the District 
Court to his mental illness in both his sentencing memorandum and at the sentencing 
hearing.  Therefore, we should review for abuse of discretion.  
We need not decide whether the remand limited the District Court or whether Clay 
properly preserved the issue.  Even assuming that the Court was not limited and the issue 
was preserved, the District Court did not abuse its discretion.         
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In sentencing a defendant, a district court must specifically address non-frivolous 
arguments by the parties “in a way that allows [the appellate court] to review the sentence 
for reasonableness.”  United States v. Jackson, 467 F.3d 834, 842 (3d Cir. 2006); see also 
United States v. Grier, 475 F.3d 556, 571 (3d Cir. 2007) (en banc) (“The touchstone of 
„reasonableness‟ is whether the record as a whole reflects rational and meaningful 
consideration of the factors enumerated in 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a).”); United States v. 
Ausburn, 502 F.3d 313, 329 (3d Cir. 2007) (“[T]he court must acknowledge and respond 
to any properly presented sentencing argument which has colorable legal merit and a 
factual basis.”). 
Here, the District Court listened to arguments from defense counsel and the 
Government regarding Clay‟s mental illness.  After imposing the sentence, the Court 
responded to Clay‟s arguments by acknowledging that it had “consider[ed] the change in 
circumstances or the information that the court now has in regard to your client‟s mental 
health status.”  App. at 117.   On this record, we are not prepared to state that the Court 
failed to sufficiently consider Clay‟s mental illness. 
III. 
 For the foregoing reasons, we will affirm.  
